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Towards the Way Out from the Closed System 
of Husserl's Monadology 
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Y oshihiko IT AKURA 
§ 1. The Problem of the Other as a U Sense" 
In a way, the unique character of the experience of other human 
beings was already treated by Husserl in his Logical Investigations 
while he was considering the contrast between the apprehension of 
a real woman and that of a mere wax doll. l When we are wandering 
around a museum, we encounter a lady winking at us with a smile. 
In a moment, our belief is suspended, without-or before-thinking 
of any other sort of entity, and starts to fluctuate between a living 
woman and what looks like a woman. (But finally, of course, we 
will find a 'doll' before us which represents a lady ... ) Some readers 
might not resist asking: "What conditions are necessary to the 
perception of a living being?" "What is the condition of possibility 
of the experience of the 'Other'?" Or more generally: "In what 
structure does the perception of an individual being function here?" 
In this case, the "intentionality" of the perceptional" act" involved 
aims at an individual. For Husserl, what is intended must be 
capable of being designated by an "occasional expression" like 
'this' or 'that', as long as it can be determined as 7:'60e 7:'l with its 
specific tempora-spatial-" real "-determinations in space and time. 
Furthermore, in Husserl's position, it is claimed that this same 
" sensuous" or "real" object, given by a perception in the narrower 
sense, is at the same time an intentional object of the "proper 
signification" (" Eigenbedeutung") which directly intends an "in-
dividual meaning "2-an "ideal" (supra-temporal) meaning-in the 
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intuition of an individual-for, otherwise, any objective reference 
would be impossible at all. It is worth noting that, originally, the 
Husserlian concept of intentionality was formed on the model of the 
assertive form of judgement in the interest of the restoration of 
logic. To meet this requirement, the" material" of judgement-an 
identical" object" (ideally, a self-identical immanent transcendence)-
must stay identical whether the intentional "act" may fluctuate 
between its different" qualities" (as well as thetic characters). In 
the above case, therefore, the "object" in the process of perception 
is supposed to remain identical in its "material "-even if, as he 
admitted in a later work3 , it might be apprehended in a new" sense", 
insofar as new noematic moments are" founded" upon the" sense" 
of underlying noeses. Here one could remember the distinction of 
Frege between the meaning of words and their referential object. 
For, in Husserl, coincidence of thinking and language is universally 
presupposed, and" recognition" is nothing else than the" Adiiquation" 
of signification (" symbolic" or "signitive intention") and intuition4• 
In terms of Ideen, this state of affairs means that intentionality 
(" noesis") can possess the same referential object (" noematic sense" 
or object itself) in different "senses". In this way, the idea of 
" sense" in Husserl involves both objective and subjective sides at 
the same time. That is, the universal character of the "sense" 
secures objective reference to an identical object while multiple 
possibilities of the way to "think" the same object are shown as 
the subjective character of "signitive" intentionality or language. 
Here, however, we would have to contend with the following 
difficulties, if we took into account the later development in Husserl's 
own thinking: 
(1) In Husserl, any object is a "constituted" object which is 
constituted in time synthesis (which is tantamount to the "self-
temporalization" of "absolute subjectivity"). In this sense, the 
"real" object is a result of subjective constitution, not the ultimate, 
nascent objectivity with respect to the problem of individuation. 
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Besides, even on the level of "reality" in this sense, the scientific 
determination of a "real object" itself would be an open question. 
(2) Even if the identity of an "individual meaning" -the 
correlate of a proper name-is secured in a sufficient manner, it 
would not be disputable that the ideality or the essentiality of the 
"individual meaning" depends on the facticity and historicity of 
an individual being, by-its very definition. Therefore, the whole 
matter rests upon how the relationship of fact and essence should 
be interpreted. The inversion which took place as Husserl came to 
understand the deep meaning of temporality must be considered. 
§ 2. Monadology as a System of Automorphisms 
It is well known that the problem of the experience of the 
'Other' was studied by Husserl through the theory of "Et'nfilhlung" 
(empathy) and interpreted in the name of "monadology". Here 
again, the' Other' is considered to be given as a "sense", and as 
one "constituted" by the transcendental ego itself. In one of the 
concluding sections in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, which aims 
at the self-justification of transcendental idealism, Husserl declares: 
" ... our 'theory' of experiencing Others" is " ... an explication of the 
sense, 'Others' as it arises from the constitutive productivity of 
that experiencing: the· sense, 'truly existing Others', as it arises 
from the corresponding harmonious synthesis (Einstimmigkeit). What 
I demonstrate to myself harmoniously as someone else, and therefore 
have. given to me, by necessity and not by choice, as an actuality 
to be acknowledged, is eo ipso the existing Other for me in the 
transcendental attitude: the alter ego demonstrated precisely within 
the experiencing intentionality of my ego "5. It is as what is 
"mirrored" in my transcendental ego (a monad) that other trans-
cendental egos (other monads) exist for me. In this sense, alter 
ego is given as a "mirroring" and an "analogue" of myself in a 
peculiar way. That is to say: in Husserl, the "self-interpretation" 
of transcendental ego means that the 'Other' is interpreted as an 
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analogue of myself, and his or her OWl1 original sphere is something 
" appresented" beyond my own·" primordial sphere". And it· is 
when I, as transcendental ego, effect transcendental reduction that 
I grasp myself in my" primordial sphere" and likewise (in the 
form of my transcendental experience of what is alien) grasp Others 
as they are-i. e.as what becomes constituted in me (as an immanel1t 
transcendence), as what is "appresentatively" mirrored by the 
empathy that I fulfill on the basis of "external experience". Thus 
it turns out that Husserl's whole analysis of experience of Others 
has been carried out as the explication of the sense 'Other' that 
has already been constituted in myself and by myself-and by 
necessity, not by choice-as my own "transcendental experience"; 
and that it was carried out as the interpretation of the limit of 
"Others that truly exist" for me by means of the correlative 
harmonic synthesis of "Einstimmigkeit". Therefore, it is quite 
natural in this sense that the Other is given as a "sense" for him, 
and is always expected to appear in exact correspondence with my 
theoretical eye engaging in phenomenological reflection and reduction 
which is nothing else than the method [itself of Husserl's phenome-
nology. 
Nevertheless, the problem remains the same: what does "sense" 
mean in Husserlian phenomenology? How is it, or should be it, 
determined in his phenomenology-once the problem of "facticity" 
has come to the foreground? Here it is presupposed that every 
eidetic "sense" of the monadologistic universe is tautologically 
represented by each monad,-a monotheistic world view of automor-
phism! And is this not similar to the case in which tautological 
descriptions of classical dynamics did not permit the "primacy of 
time and change"6? After all, all monads are unable to learn 
anything from the outside, and are concerned only with themselves. 
If, however, the "sense" of the Other cannot be separated from 
the original situation -" hic et nunc" of the original impression or 
present-in which we encounter him in the most fundamental 
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inter-subjectivity, it will follow· that the problem .of the Other-the 
meaning of the 'Other' and the Other as a'" sense" -must basically, 
be in line with that of the "facticity" which the later Husserl 
arrived at. It was Husserl himself who showed that the problem of 
individuation is that oftemporalization. And it was nonetheless 
true that he did not intr.oduce the genetic view-point of phenome-
nology when he dealt with ,the "constitution" of the sense 'Other' 
in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation. 
§ 3. The Problem, of the Sense as an It Essence" 
Apparently, the entire project of transcendental phenomenology 
is based on the methods of "Eidetik" which aim at the recognition 
of essence and of "sense" as an essence. The fundamental pre" 
supposition involved here is that our experience of the world-
therefore, that of the intersubjective world-is structured in a 
definite a priori manner; The manner in which beings are 
" constituted" as a sense, and in which. Others appear in their 
"appresentations ", is, accordingly, supposed to be in conformity 
with certain pre-established rules and a priori structures. If, in 
fact, it were not so, no science would be possible and we could 
even not lead life itself. It would be quite understandable, therefore, 
that there must be given to us numberless "essences" -stable and 
abiding as in Plato-which we can recognize any time, and as many 
times as we need. On the other hand, however, there is no denying 
that in our eidetic attitude every particular fact turns into a mere 
example which is voluntarily interchangeable with another appropriate 
case. It must be admitted that inevitably, the theory of essence 
brings with it a cleavage between fact and essence-as far as it 
excludes irreducible individual facticities. And it will also have to 
be mentioned that once the essence of an object is recognized in 
that theory, its singularity is reduced to a nulity. 
Here, a certain related problem might be pointed out. No one 
has ever successfully proved that the 'becoming' of the world 
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excludes effects of any 'contingency'. No one has proved that 
ever-changing fluidity of phenomena is purely " a priori" phenomena. 
For, in fact, it would be as difficult to prove as to disprove that 
no concept of a priori is compatible with the existence of any 
empirical' contingency '-just as there has been no guarantee ever 
given to natural scientists that every natural phenomenon can be 
inathematized in a meaningful manner7• We would be able to ask 
here whether no experience of the world-including that of Others-
involves such sense constitution as is only possible through historical 
and / or empirical moments. Take for example the historical-
diachronic-formation of the sense of a word, whose structurality, 
if any, transcends the synchronic structure of a linguistic system in 
a certain radical manner. Even though our language and 'thinking' 
may basically be characterized as the synchronic structure of a 
contemporary language and systems of culture, no one would doubt 
the facticity of such a diachronic change taking place 'between' 
individuals beyond our synchronic consciousness8• It might, therefore, 
be no wonder that Husserl himself stated in § 58 of Ideen I: "the 
rationality which we find in the fact is never the one that is 
necessitated by the essence", while the latter, for him, is the very 
thing in which he finds" a wonderful teleology". In fact, it was 
in this sense that he could not avoid speaking also about the 
"contingent a priori"9 in Formal and Transcendental Logic, as 
regards a materially and sensorially (" hyletisch") determinate 
"region ". However, it is clear that such an "a priori" is never 
, logically' necessary, even though not 'logically' impossible. In 
this respect also, it would not be meaningless to examine whether 
such an "a priori" already involves some empirical or historical 
moments, and therefore, whether the" transcendental experience" 
of such an "a priori" can be genuinely" transcendental" or not. 
And if such an a priori still deserves the name, we would have to 
ask whether it must be regarded as an historically relative a priori, 
and whether, if the latter exists at all, it follows that essences of 
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things, structures, rules of appearance, and the referential character 
of the world and language itself are eternal, or, rigourously speaking, 
only temporarily stable and self-identical, and incessantly subject to 
changelO• 
In Husserl's view, every "regional ontology", corresponding 
to each particular science, is subordinate to "formal ontology". 
The latter, the" eidetic science of objects in general ", is defined as 
"pure logic completely extended to the mathesis universalis ".1 1 
Husserl proposes here that "a priori synthetic" recognitions and 
categories should be regarded as "regional axioms" that irreducibly 
belong to each region, while "formal ontology" should determine 
the totality of formal C" analytical") categories, as "formal ontology" 
is supposed by him to involve every form of possible "material" 
ontology. Accordingly, for him, "reason itself, and especially 
theoretical reason, is a formal concept "12 while leaving as an open 
question to what extent, or how, the non-" meaning "-conferring 
moments in subjective experience-pure passivity, functioning as-
sociations etc.-contribute to "thinking" which, for him, coincides 
with language itself C" the universality of coincidence between 
language and thinking") 13. For Husserl, the passive genesis, which 
builds up temporality, is a matter of completely universal, essential 
necessity which also embraces everything new. Association itself, 
which is for him" a realm of the' innate' Apriori" and the very 
principle of passive genesis, is therefore a completely closed, immanent 
"form-system". However, it would be necessary to note here that 
the perceptual world of "Gestalt ", for example, is what is most 
difficult to mathematize in its "non-linear" characters. For the 
logico-mathematical structures, where 2+2=4 by the addition partici-
pating of the laws of the total structure of "group ", are precisely 
not those of Gestalt.14 In a "non-linear" phenomenon, the sum 
total of qualities of elements does not amount to the quality of the 
whole because of the interaction between elements where the 
behavior of an element is influenced by another element. It is clear 
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that such phenomenality, based on interaction or synergism between 
elements, is lost sight of where the whole-beyond an element and 
its individual immanence-is reduced to an immanence, and where 
no interaction with exteriority is acknowledged, as in Leibniz 
monadologyI5. In § 40 of Cartesian Meditations, Husserl says: "In 
the developed ego, this many-leveled structure [of the all-embracing 
genesis] is conserved as a persist<:;nt form-system of apperception 
and consequently of constituted objectives-among them, the ones 
belonging to an Objective universe having a fixed ontological 
structure". Thus, even though" the particular fact is irrational, .. .it 
is possible only in the apriori form-system pertaining to it as an 
egological fact", and '" fact', with its 'irrationality', is itself a 
structural concept within the system of the concrete Apriori."I6 It 
is clear, here, that there is no absolute gap acknowledged between 
the genetic streaming of consciousness and a reflecting phenomen-
ologist who endeavors to bridge over a chasm with himself by 
means of " Eidetik ". 
It is a very important problem whether, or to what extent, 
this perspective is consistent with the concrete analysis of the" living 
present" (Lebendige Gegenwart) which concerns the conditions of 
possibility of reflection itself. For the absolute facticity of the living 
present with its "original streaming" (Urstromen) is found, by 
analysis, as always preceding reflection itself, and, as L. Landgrebe 
showed brilliantlyI7, the" original streaming", as a creative process, 
cannot be apprehended by reflection which is always carried out as 
a linguistic articulation. Just as the concept of "original impres-
sion "-the original present of consciousness-is beyond the distinction 
between 'active' and 'passive', so the "original streaming", as 
" original passivity", must be beyond the distinction between essence 
and fact, the subjective and the objective, form and matter, and 
the spiritual and the corporeal. This means that the streaming 
itself, as antecedent to reflective articulationI8, cannot be comprehend-
ed as a "regional" event, in which the regional laws would explain 
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regional cases of individuation. Therefore, it is not the movement 
of reflection that brings forth individuation in the most fundamental 
sense, but rather the" original streaming" itself which must carry 
with it the principle of individuation -individuation not of "r6os re" 
in the sense of Ideen I (§§ 14-15), but rather, of an individual in 
its very etymological sense! 
§ 4. The Problem of the Pre-objective World as a Topos of 
Open Experience 
(1) The above problem seems to open up a new perspective 
on the "sense" of an individual object. For the same difficulty 
applies also to the problem of the individuation of an "object", and 
it will amount, rather, to the concealment itself of the individuality 
of an individual if an r60s re in its independent ultimate essence is 
supposed to be reducible to any material essense in regional ontology. 
To suppose that an object itself can be given in its essence or a 
type means to suppose that the essence of an object can be inter-
preted in a single perspective that is based on the relatively closed 
reference corresponding to a region. To interprete an object in 
thematization and typification will thus be to forget the world itself. 
While the consistency of our world experience requires the univocity 
of sense and context, the openness of this experience presupposes 
the undetermined sense of the world and its objects. For, precisely, 
our life world is such a world as allows the same object to be 
apprehended in multiple, often ambiguous senses, even if the" noematic 
meaning" of a given object (ideally, the" object itself") can, under 
certain conditions, be supposed to stay identical throughout the 
change in "qualities" and" thetic characters" of judgement. There 
exist, in fact, numbers of hybrids which at once possess a few 
eidetic singularities of one and the same genus.19 As contradictory 
properties of a wave motion and a particle belong to light, so does 
man show contradictory characters at the same time. Take, for 
example, the so-called "double bind" situation of a psychological 
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conflict. In such a mode of human communication another person 
is given in totally antagonistic senses at the same time, even if 
those different senses may be "founded" upon the "objective" 
context which involves" real" determinations of an external object. 
In such a case, however, it does not seem that the whole situation 
can simply be reduced to a matter of constitution of a "time 
object ", for the very excesses which cannot be absorbed into the 
unity of an "context" engender the whole phenomenon of this 
emotional situation.2o We would generally have to say that eidetic 
necessities which form <l.nd constrain a behavioral context, can be 
deranged in some affective manner, and the" context" itself has a 
tendency to be loosened or. even disrupted by unexpected moments 
in the open horizon of the lived world. And this must be because 
the world experience as such has been an open experience from the 
beginning, and it has been the experience of the unknown and 
unexpected, being more than mere re-cognition of the already known. 
In fact, in the later Husserl, the world is no longer a mere sum of 
constituted objects21. It IS not a completely closed system of the 
already established, but is the "ground of universal passive belief 
of being" or " Urdoxa " on which each thematization is carried out. 
It is always "pre-given" as a determinable undetermined horizon 
though it itself can never be completely thematized. And it must 
be for this reason that Merleau-Ponty also said: "Il est vrai qu'on 
ne parlerait de rien s'il ne fallait parler que des experiences avec 
lesquelles on coincide ... "22 Therefore we would have to conclude that 
an object, which is always in relation with other objects and always 
in the world, is never known in itself, as well as the world remains 
unknown in itself. Or we could also say, the sense of an object is 
" without bottom "23 because of the openness of our world experience 
itself. Hence the semantical ambiguity-or epaisseur-of an individual 
before being "constituted" as an univocal "object" - : " Mais cette 
reponse criticistepose un probleme: la conversion du regard qui 
transforme la vie de la conscience en une pure dialectique du sujet 
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et de l'objet, qui reduit la chose dans son epaisseur sensible a un 
reseau de significations, la reminiscence traumatique a un souvenir 
indifferent et soumet a l'examen la structure de c1asse de ma 
conscience,-explicite-t-elle une "condition de possibilite" eternelle, 
ou bien fait-elle apparaitre une nouvelle structure de conscience? 
C'est un probleme de savoir ce qui se passe par example lorsque la 
conscience se separe du temps, de ce jaillessement ininterrompu au 
centre d'elle-meme, pour l'apprehender comme une signification 
intellectuelle et maniable ... "24 
(2) If we direct ourselves towards the later manuscripts of 
Husserl, it is not impossible to give the interpretation that his 
Cartesian endeavor to ground the experience of the Other solely on 
the theory of empathy was not suitable for his own original intention. 
It is admitted, for example, in his analysis of the sexual instinct 
that" the fullfilment of an instinct when it is penetrating another 
, soul' is not an empathy with the Other ", and that such fulfillment 
is not the "act" of the Ego in the course of living in the" world ".25 
And in fact, in a certain manner, Husserl's monadology also attested 
to the posteriority of the "world" to other monads in that the 
, objective' world constituted by my ego is posterior to other egos 
who are also constituting the same-' objective '-world. Therefore, 
aside from the theory of empathy, it might be noted that in Husserl 
the object apprehended as the 'Other' in its "sense" is never an 
, objective' object which has already been constituted as a part of 
the 'objective' world. While he still holds that the plurality of 
other monads is achieved through the" self-interpretation" of the 
Ego, he assures: "the instinct or drive in its direct operation is 
not the act" of the Ego's will, and "kinestheses themsevles are 
not the modes of will "26. According to these points, we would have 
to interprete that from the outset the Others have appeared, or been 
experienced as such, before fulfillment of empathy. And it has 
been so through my genuine sensibility and its achievements that 
is functioning in the "constantly persisting underlayer of the 
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primordial world "27. Moreover, here we find· a further problem, 
namely, how Husserl can maintain his basic idea that "sense" 
conferring activities (i. e. "thinking" or "noesis") coincide with 
signitive (symbolic) intention or language, if such passive and 
pre-predicative functions of instinctual communication are already 
constitutive of the "sense" Other, and if instincts and drives are 
not the "act" of my Ego, and if kinestheses themselves are not 
the modes of the will. For kinesthesis works as the most basic 
constitutive layer of the world constitution in Husserl, and the 
perspective of the perceived world is always uniquely being given 
as a correlate of the mode of my own kinesthesis. And finally, 
we would also have to examine whether affectivity itself is not 
only a matter of auto-affection, but also of "hetero-affection" 
(Levin as) which presupposes the" asymmetrical" relationship with 
exteriority or Others that engenders veritable interaction between 
lives. 
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